John Searle

I will look at Immigration from persepective of phenomenology and its somewhat foucauldian understanding of governmentality in third way marxism that integrates phenomenology. The term economism has been kept as a primary reason to close the state borders from immigration. There are different ideas of which sector of being clearly defined kind of legitimizes the sovereign. My hypotheses is that in the economic times of third way economic policies just behind us economic is the most clearly defined category to legitimize sovereign and its borders in many senses. Economism as reason to keep borders closed is paradoxical since economic activity most clearly penetrates the borders. Poststructuralist analysis of flows like in Gilles Deleuze or of hospitality in political sense and context in Jacques Derrida are important. Phenomenology helps to understand governmentality as I will argue/show. It can also help to see keeping people out of sovereign - like the state as question of governmentality. The question becomes technical question of governmentality. the point and argument is to sketch out the technical governmentality concerning the immigration question mostly after all phenomenologically.

This article provides a philosophical analysis of identity within the context of artificial intelligence, from the perspective of Transcendent Philosophy (especially the views of Mulla Sadra) and contemporary philosophy. With the rapid advancements in artificial intelligence as one of the most significant innovations in computer science, issues such as the reconstruction of human identity and its comparison with natural intelligence have come to the fore. The paper examines the philosophical capacities and limitations of this phenomenon, exploring the perspectives of Mulla Sadra and John Searle, and offers a comparative analysis of their views on identity and consciousness in machines and artificial intelligence. According to the views of these two thinkers, artificial intelligence, despite its advancements, cannot achieve human identity, as it lacks essential characteristics such as consciousness, intentionality, and abstraction. Searle argues that artificial systems will never be able to attain genuine consciousness because understanding meaning and consciousness are intrinsic to the human brain and mind, qualities that cannot be attributed to machines. He consistently supports this belief through the Chinese Room experiment and various critiques of artificial systems.

The mind-body problem is one of the most fundamental and complex issues in the philosophy of mind, addressing the relationship between mental states and brain processes. John Searle, the contemporary American philosopher, has attempted to offer a distinctive response to this problem through a theory known as biological naturalism. In his view, mental phenomena such as consciousness are not only the result of biological processes in the brain, but also constitute higher-level features of those processes. By distinguishing between causal reductionism and the ontological irreducibility of consciousness, Searle seeks to establish a middle path between reductive physicalism and dualism. Key concepts in his view—including intentionality, mental causation, and emergent properties—play a central role in explaining the workings of the human mind. Nevertheless, his theory has faced significant criticism from philosophers such as Dennett, Nagel, and Chalmers, some of whom consider Searle’s biological naturalism to be a new form of property dualism. This paper analyzes the theoretical foundations and structure of biological naturalism, aiming to assess its explanatory power in addressing the mind-body problem and to clarify its relation to competing philosophical approaches.